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## On Provability Logic of HA

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# Propositional non-modal language

$$\mathcal{L}_0 : \quad \vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \text{par}, \text{var}$$

- $\text{var}$  and  $\text{par}$  are countably infinite sets of atomics and  $\top, \perp \in \text{par}$ .
- $\neg A := A \rightarrow \perp$ .
- $\text{atom} := \text{par} \cup \text{var}$
- $\text{par}$  stands for  $\Sigma_1$ -substitutions,  $\text{var}$  for arbitrary.
- For a propositional substitution  $\theta$ , by default  $\theta(p) := p$  for every  $p \in \text{par}$ .
- $\mathcal{L}_0(X)$  indicates the set of all Boolean combinations of propositions in the set  $X$ .

# Modal language

$$\mathcal{L}_\triangleright := \mathcal{L}_0 + \triangleright \quad \text{and} \quad \Box A := \top \triangleright A \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{L}_\Box := \mathcal{L}_0 + \Box$$

- $\triangleright$  is a binary modal operator.
- We usually consider  $A \triangleright B$  for preservativity.
- $B := \{\Box A : A \in \mathcal{L}_\Box\}$ .
- $\text{parb} := \text{par} \cup B$ .
- $\text{atomb} := \text{atom} \cup B$ .
- $\Box A := A \wedge \Box A$ .

# Logics

**K:**  $\Box(A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow (\Box A \rightarrow \Box B)$ .

**4:**  $\Box A \rightarrow \Box \Box A$ .

**L:**  $\Box(\Box A \rightarrow A) \rightarrow \Box A$ . (The Löb's axiom)

**C<sub>p</sub>:**  $p \rightarrow \Box p$  for every  $p \in \text{par}$ .

**C<sub>a</sub>:**  $a \rightarrow \Box a$  for every  $a \in \text{atom}$ .

Given a logic  $L$  and axiom-schemata  $X_1, \dots, X_n$ , the logic  $LX_1 \dots X_n$  is defined as  $L$  plus the axioms  $X_1, \dots, X_n$ . Then we define following modal logics:

- **i:** IPC plus necessitation and  $C_p$ .
- **iGL** := **iK4L**.

# Propositional substitutions

- $\theta(x)$  is a proposition in the language  $\mathcal{L}_\triangleright$  for every  $x \in \text{var}$ .
- $\theta(p) = p$  for every  $p \in \text{par}$ .
- $\theta(B \circ C) = \theta(B) \circ \theta(C)$  for every  $\circ \in \{\vee, \wedge, \rightarrow, \triangleright\}$ .

Given  $\theta$ , define  $\hat{\theta}$  same as  $\theta$  except for boxed propositions for which  $\hat{\theta}$  operates as identity:

$$\hat{\theta}(A \triangleright B) := A \triangleright B \text{ and hence } \hat{\theta}(\Box A) := \Box A.$$

# Heyting Arithmetic

The Heyting arithmetic is defined as the intuitionistic fragment of first-order Peano Arithmetic PA.

# Arithmetical substitutions

A function  $\alpha$  on **atom** such that  $\alpha(a)$  is a first-order arithmetical sentence for every  $a \in \mathbf{atom}$  and  $\alpha(a) \in \Sigma_1$  for every  $a \in \mathbf{par}$  and  $\alpha(\perp) = \perp$  and  $\alpha(\top) = \top$ . Moreover  $\alpha$  is called a  $\Sigma_1$ -substitution if  $\alpha(a) \in \Sigma_1$  for every  $a \in \mathbf{atom}$ .

- $\alpha_{\text{HA}}(a) := \alpha(a)$  for every  $a \in \mathbf{atom}$ , and  $\alpha_{\text{HA}}(\perp) = \perp$ .
- $\alpha_{\text{HA}}$  commutes with boolean connectives:  $\vee, \wedge$  and  $\rightarrow$ .
- $\alpha_{\text{HA}}(A \triangleright B)$  is defined as an arithmetization of  $\Sigma_1$ -preservativity: For every  $E \in \Sigma_1$ ,  
 if  $\text{HA} \vdash E \rightarrow \alpha_{\text{HA}}(A)$  then  $\text{HA} \vdash E \rightarrow \alpha_{\text{HA}}(B)$ .
- $\alpha_{\text{HA}}(\square A) =$  an arithmetization of “ $A$  is provable in HA”.



$PL^\square(\text{HA})$ , the provability logic of HA is defined as

$$\{A \in \mathcal{L}_\square : \text{HA} \vdash \alpha_{\text{HA}}(A) \text{ for every arithmetical substitution } \alpha\}$$

$PL^\triangleright(\text{HA})$ , the Preservativity logic of HA is defined

$$\{A \in \mathcal{L}_\triangleright : \text{HA} \vdash \alpha_{\text{HA}}(A) \text{ for every arithmetical substitution } \alpha\}$$

Similarly one may define  $PL^\square_\Sigma(\text{HA})$  and  $PL^\triangleright_\Sigma(\text{HA})$  as provability and preservativity logics for  $\Sigma_1$ -substitutions.

- $\text{PL}^\square(\text{HA}) \not\vdash \square(A \vee B) \rightarrow (\square A \vee \square B)$ , Myhill [1973]; Friedman [1975]
- $\text{PL}^\square(\text{HA}) \vdash \square(A \vee B) \rightarrow \square(\Box A \vee \Box B)$ , in which  $\Box A$  is a shorthand for  $A \wedge \square A$ , Leivant [1975]
- $\text{PL}^\square(\text{HA}) \vdash \square\neg\neg\square A \rightarrow \square\square A$  and  $\text{PL}^\square(\text{HA}) \vdash \square(\neg\neg\square A \rightarrow \square A) \rightarrow \square(\square A \vee \neg\square A)$ , Visser [1981, 1982]
- Decidability of letterless fragment of  $\text{PL}^\square(\text{HA})$ . Visser [2002]
- Axiomatization and decidability of  $\text{PL}_\Sigma^\square(\text{HA})$ . Ardeshir and Mojtahedi [2018]; Visser and Zoethout [2019]
- Axiomatization and decidability of  $\text{PL}_\Sigma^\square(\text{HA})$  relative in PA and  $\mathbb{N}$ . Mojtahedi [2021]

The following translation, is some variant of the Gödel's celebrated translation for the embedding of IPC in S4 [Gödel, 1933].

## Definition

For every proposition  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  define  $A^\square$  inductively as follows:

- $A^\square := \Box A$ , for  $A \in \text{var}$ .
- $A^\square := A$  for  $A \in \text{parb}$ .
- $(B \circ C)^\square := B^\square \circ C^\square$ . for  $\circ \in \{\vee, \wedge\}$ .
- $(B \rightarrow C)^\square := \Box (B^\square \rightarrow C^\square)$ .

- $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  is called self complete if there is some  $B \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  such that  $A = B^\square$ :

$$S := \{B^\square : B \in \mathcal{L}_\square\}.$$

- $A$  is called T-complete if  $T \vdash A \rightarrow \square A$ :

$$C^T := \{A \in \mathcal{L}_\square : T \vdash A \rightarrow \square A\}.$$

- If  $T \supseteq \text{iK4}$  we have  $S \subseteq C^T$ .
- We may omit the superscript  $T$  in the notation  $C^T$  and simply write  $C$ .

A Kripke model for the intuitionistic modal logic, is a combination of a Kripke model for intuitionistic logic and the classical modal logic. Let  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \prec, \Box, V)$ :

- $W \neq \emptyset$ .
- $(W, \prec)$  is a partial order (transitive and irreflexive). We write  $\preceq$  for the reflexive closure of  $\prec$ .
- $V$  is the valuation on atomics, i.e.  $V \subseteq W \times \text{atom}$ .
- $w \preceq u$  and  $w V a$  implies  $u V a$  for every  $w, u \in W$  and  $a \in \text{atom}$ .
- $(\preceq; \Box) \subseteq \Box$ , i.e.  $w \preceq u \Box v$  implies  $w \Box v$ . This condition is assumed to ensure that the previous property holds for all modal propositions and not only for  $a \in \text{atom}$ .

$V$  is extended to all modal propositions:

- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash a$  iff  $w V a$ , for  $a \in \text{atom}$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A \wedge B$  iff  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A$  and  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash B$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A \vee B$  iff  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A$  or  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash B$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A \rightarrow B$  iff for every  $u \succcurlyeq w$  if we have  $\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash A$  then  $\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash B$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A \triangleright B$  iff for every  $u \sqsubset w$  with  $\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash A$  we have  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash B$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash \square A$  iff for every  $u \sqsubset w$  we have  $\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash A$ .

- We say that  $u$  is a successor of  $w$  if  $w \sqsubset u$ .
- We say that  $u$  is a predecessor of  $w$  if  $u \sqsubset w$ .
- We say that  $u$  is above  $w$  if  $w \preceq u$ .
- We say that  $u$  is beneath  $w$  if  $u \preceq w$ .
- We say that  $u$  is generated by  $w$  if  $w (\overline{\sqsubset \cup \preceq}) u$ .
- $\overline{S}$  indicates the reflexive transitive closure of  $S$ .

## Theorem

*iGL is sound and complete for good Kripke models. Also iGLC<sub>a</sub> is sound and complete for good C<sub>a</sub> Kripke models.*



- The class of *No Nested Implications to the Left*, NNIL formulae, for the nonmodal language  $\mathcal{L}_0$ , was introduced in [Visser et al., 1995], and more explored in [Visser, 2002].
- Visser et al. [1995] characterize the NNIL via Kripke semantics.
- $A \in \text{NNIL}$  and  $A \in \text{NI}$  for every  $A \in \text{atomb.}$
- $B \circ C \in \text{NNIL}$  if  $B, C \in \text{NNIL}$ . Also  $B \circ C \in \text{NI}$  if  $B, C \in \text{NI}$ .  
 ( $\circ \in \{\vee, \wedge\}$ )
- $B \rightarrow C \in \text{NNIL}$  if  $B \in \text{NI}$  and  $C \in \text{NNIL}$ .

- One of the most interesting features of the Gödel-Löb axiom, is the fixed-point theorem.
- It is the propositional remainder of the Gödels diagonalization lemma.
- It says that if  $x$  only appears in the scope of  $\Box$  in  $A$ , then there is some  $D$  such that  $\text{GL} \vdash D \leftrightarrow A[x : D]$ . [Smoryński, 1985]
- One may generalize the same fixed-point theorem to iGL. [Iemhoff et al., 2005]
- It is well-known that one may generalize this fixed-point theorem to a simultaneous version.

## Theorem

Let  $\vec{E} := \{E_1, \dots, E_m\}$  and  $\vec{a} = \{a_1, \dots, a_m\}$  such that every occurrences of  $a_i$  in  $E_j$  is in the scope of some  $\Box$ . Then there is a substitution  $\tau$  which is the simultaneous fixed point of  $\vec{a}$  with respect to  $\vec{E}$  in iGL, i.e.

- $\text{iGL} \vdash \tau(E_i) \leftrightarrow \tau(a_i)$  for every  $1 \leq i \leq m$ .

## Unification

- Unification problem (in propositional Logic  $\mathbf{L}$ ) asks for substitutions  $\theta$  which unify  $A$ , i.e.  $\mathbf{L} \vdash \theta(A)$ .
- More ambitiously: describe the set of all unifiers for  $A$ .
- $\theta \leq \gamma$  iff there is some  $\lambda$  s.t.  $\mathbf{L} \vdash \theta(x) \leftrightarrow \lambda\gamma(x)$ .
- Classical logic: every unifiable proposition has a most general unifier.

If  $\theta$  is a unifier of  $A$  then  $\chi_\theta$  is a most general one:

$$\chi_\theta(x) := (A \wedge x) \vee (\neg A \wedge \theta(x))$$

$\chi_\theta$  is a unifier indeed:

$$A \vdash \chi_\theta(A) \leftrightarrow \top \quad \text{and} \quad \neg A \vdash \chi_\theta(A) \leftrightarrow \top.$$

$\chi_\theta$  is more general than every other unifier  $\gamma$ :

$$A \vdash \chi_\theta(x) \leftrightarrow x \implies \gamma(A) \vdash \gamma\chi_\theta(x) \leftrightarrow \gamma(x)$$

## Definition

$A$  is called projective (in  $\mathbf{L}$ ) if there is some unifier  $\theta$  for  $A$  s.t. for every  $x \in \text{var}$ :

$$A \vdash_{\mathbf{L}} \theta(x) \leftrightarrow x$$

- $x \vee \neg x$  does not have a most general unifier in IPC.
- Ghilardi [1999] answered to the unification problem for  $L = IPC$  and  $\text{par} = \emptyset$  (Elementary unification or E-unification).
- Ghilardi [1999] first characterized projectives via Kripke semantics.
- Then with the aid of projective approximations he proved that IPC is finitary, i.e. every unifiable  $A$  has a finite set of unifiers which are more general than every unifier of  $A$ .

## Projectivity: relativised

- Instead of unification ( $\top$ -fication) we consider  $\Gamma$ -fication for  $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_0(\text{par})$ .
- This means that we ask for all  $\theta$ 's such that  $\mathbf{L} \vdash \theta(A) \in \Gamma$ , i.e.  $\mathbf{L} \vdash \theta(A) \leftrightarrow E$  for some  $E \in \Gamma$ .
- In this setting, we say that  $A$  is  $\Gamma$ -projective iff there is a  $\Gamma$ -fier  $\theta$  for  $A$  which is projective:

$$A \vdash_{\mathbf{L}} \theta(x) \leftrightarrow x$$

- $\Downarrow\Gamma :=$  the set of all  $\Gamma$ -projective propositions.

In the first of two consecutive manuscripts on provability logic of HA we considered the case  $\Gamma = \text{NNIL}(\text{par})$  and  $L = \text{IPC}$ . We followed Ghilardi [1999] to

- characterize  $\text{NNIL}(\text{par})$ -projectivity via Kripke semantics,
- and then for a given  $A$ , compute a finite  $\text{NNIL}(\text{par})$ -projective approximation.



## Admissible rules

- The problem of admissibility (Friedman 1975) asks for the characterization and decidability of all inference rules  $A/B$  which are admissible to the logic  $L$ , i.e. for every substitution  $\theta$  if we have  $L \vdash \theta(A)$  then  $L \vdash \theta(B)$ .
- The classical case is trivial:  $A/B$  is admissible iff  $A \rightarrow B$  is derivable.
- $\neg x \rightarrow (y \vee z) / (\neg x \rightarrow y) \vee (\neg x \rightarrow z)$  is admissible to IPC.  
[Harrop, 1960]
- Rybakov [1987] showed that admissibility for IPC is decidable.

## Admissible rules of IPC

- de Jongh and Visser provided a base for all known admissible rules of IPC and conjectured it to be complete.
- Iemhoff [2001b] with the aid of [Ghilardi, 1999] proved the completeness of the base.

## Relative admissibility

- In the first manuscript, we considered a relative version of admissibility.
- We say that  $A/B$  is admissible relative in  $\Gamma$  if

$$\forall E \in \Gamma \forall \theta ( \vdash \theta(E \rightarrow A) \implies \vdash \theta(E \rightarrow B) ).$$

- Following the tools and methods in [Iemhoff, 2001b] we found a base for the admissibility relative in NNIL(par).

# NNIL(par)-projective approximation

◀ ( $\downarrow N(\square)^V$ , iGL) rsdC

## Theorem

Given  $A \in \mathcal{L}_0$ , there is a finite set  $\Pi \subseteq \downarrow N(\text{par})$  such that

- ①  $\text{IPC} \vdash \bigvee \Pi \rightarrow A$ .
- ②  $[\text{IPC}, \text{par}] \vdash A \triangleright \bigvee \Pi$ . ▶
- ③  $\Pi$  is computable as a function of  $A$ .



## Elevating projectivity to the modal language I

Let  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  and  $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_0(\text{parb})$ . A substitution  $\theta$  is called *A-projective* (in  $\mathbb{T}$ ) if

$$\text{For all atomic } a \text{ we have } \mathbb{T} \vdash A \rightarrow (a \leftrightarrow \theta(a)). \quad (3.1)$$

A substitution  $\theta$ , is a  $\Gamma$ -frier for  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  (notation  $A \xrightarrow{\theta} \Gamma$ ), if

$$\mathbb{T} \vdash \hat{\theta}(A) \in \Gamma \quad \text{i.e. } \hat{\theta}(A) \text{ is } \mathbb{T}\text{-equivalent to some } A' \in \Gamma.$$

$\theta$  is a unifier for  $A$  if it is  $\{\mathbb{T}\}$ -frier for  $A$ .

## Elevating projectivity to the modal language II

- We say that a substitution  $\theta$  projects  $A$  to  $\Gamma$  in  $\top$  (notation:  $A \xrightarrow[\top]{\theta} \Gamma$ ) if  $\theta$  is  $A$ -projective in  $\top$  and  $A \xrightarrow[\top]{\theta} \Gamma$ .
- We say that  $A$  is  $\Gamma$ -projective in  $\top$  if there is some  $\theta$  such that  $A \xrightarrow[\top]{\theta} \Gamma$ .
- $\downarrow^\top \Gamma$  indicates the set of all propositions which are  $\Gamma$ -projective in  $\top$ .
- $A$  is projective, if it is  $\{\top\}$ -projective.

## Some notations on sets of propositions

- We write  $X_1 \dots X_n$  for  $X_1 \cap \dots \cap X_n$ .
- $\Gamma^\vee := \{\bigvee \Delta : \Delta \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \Gamma \text{ and } \Delta \neq \emptyset\}$ .
- $\Gamma(X) := \Gamma \cap \mathcal{L}_0(X)$  and  $\Gamma(\square) := \Gamma(\text{parb})$ .
- $\downarrow^\Gamma \Gamma :=$  the set of all  $\Gamma$ -projective propositions in the logic  $\mathbb{T}$ .
- $(.)^\vee$  has the lowest precedence and  $\downarrow(.)$  has the second lowest precedence. This means that

$$\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee := (\downarrow(\text{SN}(\square)))^\vee \quad \text{and} \quad \text{C}\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee := (\text{C}(\downarrow(\text{SN}(\square))))^\vee.$$



## Definitions of admissibility and preservativity

$A \Vdash_r^\top B$  iff for every substitution  $\theta$  and  $C \in \Gamma$ :  
$$\top \vdash \hat{\theta}(C \rightarrow A) \Rightarrow \top \vdash \hat{\theta}(C \rightarrow B).$$

$A \Vdash_r^\top B$  iff  $\forall E \in \Gamma (\top \vdash E \rightarrow A \Rightarrow \top \vdash E \rightarrow B)$ .

$\hat{\theta}$  is same as  $\theta$  on the non-modal language and  $\hat{\theta}(\Box B) := \Box B$ .



By definition it can be inferred that  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma}^{\mathbb{T}} B$  implies  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma} B$ , however the converse may not hold. As a counterexample let  $A$  and  $B$  two different variables and  $\Gamma := \{\top\}$  and  $\mathbb{T} = \text{IPC}$ . Then we have  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma} B$  and not  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma}^{\mathbb{T}} B$ .

## Theorem

*Let  $\mathbb{T}$  be a logic which is closed under outer substitutions. Then  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma}^{\mathbb{T}} B$  implies  $A \Vdash_{\Gamma} B$ .*

## Some more notations

- $P^T := \{A : T \vdash A \rightarrow B \vee C \Rightarrow T \vdash A \rightarrow B \text{ or } T \vdash A \rightarrow C\}$ .
- $\Gamma^\vee := \{\bigvee \Delta : \emptyset \neq \Delta \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \Gamma\}$ .

We may omit  $T$  from notations  $P^T$  and  $C^T$ .

[ $\mathbb{T}$ ]

◀ SN( $\square$ )-rsdc

◀ Projec-Res

Given a logic  $\mathbb{T}$ , the logic  $[\mathbb{T}]$  proves statements  $A \triangleright B$  for  $A$  and  $B$  in the language of  $\mathbb{T}$  and has the following axioms and rules:

### Aximos

**Ax :**  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $\mathbb{T} \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

### Rules

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{ Conj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{ Cut}$$

These axioms and rule are not interesting, because  $[\mathbb{T}] \vdash A \triangleright B$  iff  $\mathbb{T} \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

## Extra axioms for preservativity and admissibility

**Le:**  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$ .

**Le<sup>-</sup>:**  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_0(\text{parb})$ .

**A:**  $A \triangleright \hat{\theta}(A)$ , for every substitution  $\theta$ .

**V( $\Delta$ ):**  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_\Delta(E_i)$ , in which  $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$   
 and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_\Delta(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \Delta \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \Delta)}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B} \text{Mont}(\Delta)$$



## Intuitionistic submodel property

Given two Kripke models  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V)$  and  $\mathcal{K}' = (W', \preceq', \sqsubset', V')$ , we say that  $\mathcal{K}'$  is an intuitionistic submodel of  $\mathcal{K}$  (notation  $\mathcal{K}' \leq \mathcal{K}$ ) iff  $W = W'$ ,  $\sqsubset = \sqsubset'$ ,  $V = V'$  and  $\preceq' \subseteq \preceq$ . A class  $\mathcal{K}$  of Kripke models has intuitionistic submodel property, if  $\mathcal{K}' \leq \mathcal{K} \in \mathcal{K}$  implies  $\mathcal{K}' \in \mathcal{K}$ . A modal logic  $\top$  is said to have intuitionistic submodel property iff it is sound and complete for some class  $\mathcal{K}$  of good Kripke models with intuitionistic submodel property.

## General soundness: preservativity



### Theorem (Soundness)

$[T]$  is sound for preservativity interpretations, i.e.  $[T] \vdash A \triangleright B$  implies  $A \stackrel{T}{\approx} B$  for every set  $\Gamma$  of propositions and every logic  $T$ .  
Moreover

- if  $\Gamma$  is  $T$ -complete, then  $\mathsf{Le}$  is sound,
- if  $\Gamma$  is  $T$ -prime, then  $\mathsf{Disj}$  is also sound,
- if  $\Gamma$  is closed under  $\Delta$ -conjunctions, then  $\mathsf{Mont}(\Delta)$  is sound.
- if  $T$  has intuitionistic submodel property and  $\Gamma \subseteq \mathsf{NNIL}$  and  $\Delta \subseteq \mathsf{atomb}$  then  $\mathsf{V}(\Delta)$  is sound.
- if  $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}_0(\mathsf{parb})$  and  $T$  is closed under outer substitutions, then  $\mathsf{A}$  is also sound.



## General soundness: admissibility

### Theorem (Soundness)

$[\mathsf{T}]$  is sound for admissibility interpretations, i.e.  $[\mathsf{T}] \vdash A \triangleright B$  implies  $A \vdash_{\mathsf{T}}^{\perp} B$  for every set  $\Gamma$  of propositions and every logic  $\mathsf{T}$  which is closed under outer substitutions. Moreover

- if  $\Gamma$  is  $\mathsf{T}$ -complete, then  $\text{Le}^-$  is sound,
- if  $\Gamma$  is  $\mathsf{T}$ -prime, then  $\text{Disj}$  is also sound.
- if  $\Gamma$  is closed under outer substitutions of  $\Delta$ -conjunctions, i.e.  $A \in \Gamma$  and  $B \in \Delta$  implies  $A \wedge \hat{\theta}(B) \in \Gamma$  (up to  $\mathsf{T}$ -provable equivalence relation), then  $\text{Mont}(\Delta)$  is sound.
- if  $\mathsf{T}$  has intuitionistic submodel property and  $\Gamma \subseteq \text{NNIL}$  and  $\Delta \subseteq \text{parb}$  then  $\text{V}(\Delta)$  is sound.



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## Greatest lower bound (glb)

- $B$  is a  $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ -lb for  $A$  if:
  - ①  $B \in \Gamma$ ,
  - ②  $\mathbb{T} \vdash B \rightarrow A$ .
- $B$  is the  $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ -glb for  $A$ , if for every  $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ -lb  $B'$  for  $A$  we have  $\mathbb{T} \vdash B' \rightarrow B$ .
- Up to  $\mathbb{T}$ -provable equivalence relation, such glb is unique and we annotate it as  $\lfloor A \rfloor_\Gamma^\mathbb{T}$ .
- $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$  is downward compact, if every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  has a  $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ -glb  $\lfloor A \rfloor_\Gamma^\mathbb{T}$ .
- If  $\lfloor A \rfloor_\Gamma^\mathbb{T}$  can be effectively computed, we say that  $(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$  is recursively downward compact.

## Theorem (Visser [2002])

(NNIL, IPC) is recursively downward compact.

$\lfloor A \rfloor_{\text{NNIL}}^{\text{IPC}}$  is named  $A^*$  in [Visser, 2002], the so called Visser's NNIL algorithm.

## Question

*One may similarly define the notion of least upper bounds and upward compactness. Does downward compactness imply upward compactness?*

## $(\Gamma, \top)$ -glb and $\overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\approx}}$

### Theorem

$B$  is the  $(\Gamma, \top)$ -glb for  $A$  iff

- $B \in \Gamma$ ,
- $\top \vdash B \rightarrow A$ ,
- $A \overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\approx}} B$ .

Hence we have  $A \overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\approx}} [A]_{\Gamma}^{\top}$ .

### Corollary

If  $[A]_{\Gamma}^{\top}$  exists, then for every  $B \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$  we have

$$\top \vdash [A]_{\Gamma}^{\top} \rightarrow B \quad \text{iff} \quad A \overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\approx}} B.$$

## Question

The glb may be expressed via preservativity relation  $\overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\rightsquigarrow}}$ . One may think of its twin sister which best suites for lub's:

$$A \overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\rightsquigarrow}} B \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall E \in \Gamma(\top \vdash A \rightarrow E \Rightarrow \top \vdash B \rightarrow E).$$

We ask for an axiomatization for  $\overset{\top}{\underset{\Gamma}{\rightsquigarrow}}$  when we let  $\top = \text{IPC}$  and  $\Gamma = \text{NNIL}$ .

## Normal forms

Define  $\Gamma\text{-NF}_0$  as the set of propositions  $B \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  with either  $B \in \Gamma$  or  $\square B \in \Gamma$ . Then define the set  $\Gamma\text{-NF}$  of propositions in  $\Gamma$ -Normal Form as follows:

$$\Gamma\text{-NF} := \{A \in \mathcal{L}_\square : \forall \square B \in \text{sub}(A) \ B \in \Gamma\text{-NF}_0\}.$$





## Extension property

A class  $\mathcal{M}$  of rooted Kripke models is said to have *extension property* if for every finite set  $\mathcal{K} \subseteq \mathcal{M}$  there is some finite set of rooted Kripke models  $\mathcal{K}'$  such that a variant of  $\sum(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{K}')$  belongs to  $\mathcal{M}$ .

# Prime factorization




Before we continue with the axiomatization and decidability of several preservativities, let us see some preliminaries.

## Theorem

Let  $T$  has extension property. Then

- $N(\square) = PN(\square)^\vee$  and  $SN(\square) = SPN(\square)^\vee$ .
- $N = PN^\vee$  and  $SN = SPN^\vee$ , whenever  $T \supseteq iK4C_a$ .

## Corollary

$\overset{T}{\approx}_{SN(\square)} = \overset{T}{\approx}_{SPN(\square)}$  and  $\overset{T}{\approx}_{SN(\square)} = \overset{T}{\approx}_{SPN(\square)}$  and  $\overset{T}{\approx}_{N(\square)} = \overset{T}{\approx}_{PN(\square)}$  and if  $T \supseteq iK4C_a$  then  $\overset{T}{\approx}_{SN} = \overset{T}{\approx}_{SPN}$ . 

## Theorem

$A^h := (A^*)^\square = \lfloor A \rfloor_{\text{SN}}^{\text{iGLC}_a}$  and hence  $(\text{SN}, \text{iGLC}_a)$  is recursively strong downward compact. Moreover  $\llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le} \vdash A \triangleright A^h$ .

## Proof.

Derived by [rdc of \(NNIL, IPC\)](#) from Visser [2002]. □

**Ax :**  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $iGLC_a \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

**Le:**  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$ .

**V(atomb) :**  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_{\text{atomb}}(E_i)$ , in which  
 $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$  and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_{\text{atomb}}(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \text{atomb} \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{Conj}$$

$$\frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{Cut}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \text{atomb})}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B}$$

## Theorem

$$\llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le} = \underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SN}^\vee}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SPN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SPN}^\vee}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} .$$

Moreover all above relations are decidable.

## Proof.

► Prime factorization and ►  $\underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SN}^\vee}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a}$  imply  $\underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SN}^\vee}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SPN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} = \underset{\text{SPN}^\vee}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a}$ .

► General soundness implies  $\llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le} \subseteq \underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a}$ .

To show  $\underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} \subseteq \llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le}$ , let  $A \underset{\text{SN}}{\approx}^{\text{iGLC}_a} B$ . Then  $A^h \rightarrow B$  and hence  $\llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le} \vdash A^h \triangleright B$ . Since  $\llbracket \text{iGLC}_a, \text{atomb} \rrbracket \text{Le} \vdash A \triangleright A^h$ , Cut implies desired result.  $\square$



**Ax**:  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $\text{iGLC}_a \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

**V(parb)**:  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_{\text{parb}}(E_i)$ , in which  $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$   
 and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_{\text{parb}}(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \text{parb} \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{Conj}$$

$$\frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{Cut}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \text{parb})}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B}$$

## Theorem

*All are decidable:*

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \text{iGL, parab} \rrbracket &= \underset{\downarrow N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{\downarrow PN(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{\downarrow PN(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \\ &= \underset{N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{N(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{PN(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{PN(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} . \end{aligned}$$

## Proof sketch.

► Prime factorization and ►  $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{H}^\vee$  imply  $\underset{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{\downarrow PN(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{\downarrow PN(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}}$  and  $\underset{N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{N(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{PN(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} = \underset{PN(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}}$ . Moreover ► implies  $\underset{N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} \subseteq \underset{\downarrow N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}}$ .

► General soundness implies  $\llbracket \text{iGL, parab} \rrbracket \subseteq \underset{N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}}$ . To show  $\underset{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\cong}} \subseteq \llbracket \text{iGL, parab} \rrbracket$ , let  $A \underset{\downarrow N(\square)}{\overset{\text{iGL}}{\vdash}} B$ . Hence  $\text{iGL} \vdash [A]_{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \rightarrow B$  and thus  $\llbracket \text{iGL, parab} \rrbracket \vdash [A]_{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \triangleright B$ . Since  $\llbracket \text{iGL, parab} \rrbracket \vdash A \triangleright [A]_{\downarrow N(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}}$  we are done. □





**Ax**:  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $\text{iGLC}_a \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

**Le<sup>-</sup>**:  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_0(\text{parb})$ .

**V(parb)**:  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_{\text{parb}}(E_i)$ , in which  $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$   
 and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_{\text{parb}}(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \text{parb} \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{Conj} \qquad \frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{Cut} \qquad \frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \text{parb})}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B}$$

## Theorem

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket \text{Le}^- &= \underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SPN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \\ &= \underset{\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SPN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} . \end{aligned}$$

## Proof sketch.

► Prime factorization and  $\mathcal{H}^\top = \mathcal{H}^\vee$  imply

$$\underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\downarrow \text{SPN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} \text{ and}$$

$$\underset{\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} = \underset{\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} . \text{ Moreover } \blacktriangleright \text{ implies}$$

$$\underset{\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} \subseteq \underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} . \text{ } \blacktriangleright \text{ General soundness implies } \llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket \text{Le}^- \subseteq \underset{\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} . \text{ To}$$

show  $\underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} \subseteq \llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket \text{Le}^-$ , let  $A \underset{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}^{\text{iGL}} B$ . Hence

$$\text{iGL} \vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \rightarrow B \text{ and thus } \llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket \text{Le}^- \vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \triangleright B .$$

Since  $\llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket \text{Le}^- \vdash A \triangleright \llbracket A \rrbracket_{\downarrow \text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}}$  we are done.  $\square$

## Theorem

$(C\downarrow SN(\square)^V, iGL)$  is recursively strong downward compact.

Moreover  $\llbracket iGL, \text{parb} \rrbracket Le \vdash A \triangleright [A]_{C\downarrow SN(\square)^V}^{iGL}$ .

## Proof sketch.

Given  $A$ , one first compute  $[A]_{\downarrow SN(\square)^V}^{iGL}$ . Then define

$$[A]_{C\downarrow SN(\square)^V}^{iGL} := \square [A]_{\downarrow SN(\square)^V}^{iGL}$$



**Ax:**  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $\text{iGLC}_a \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

**Le:**  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$ .

**V(parb):**  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_{\text{parb}}(E_i)$ , in which  $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$   
 and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_{\text{parb}}(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \text{parb} \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{Conj} \qquad \frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{Cut} \qquad \frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \text{parb})}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B}$$

## Theorem

$$\llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket_{\text{Le}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}}$$

Moreover all mentioned relations are decidable.

## Proof.

▶ Prime factorization and ▶  $\overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}}$  imply

$\overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}} = \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}}$ . ▶ General soundness implies  
 $\llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket_{\text{Le}} \subseteq \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SPN}(\square)}{\cong}}$ . To show  $\overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}{\cong}} \subseteq \llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket_{\text{Le}}$ , let  
 $A \overset{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)}{\cong}} B$ . Hence  $\text{iGL} \vdash [A]_{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \rightarrow B$  and thus

$\llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket_{\text{Le}} \vdash [A]_{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}} \triangleright B$ . Since

$\llbracket \text{iGL, parb} \rrbracket_{\text{Le}} \vdash A \triangleright [A]_{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)^\vee}^{\text{iGL}}$  we are done. □

## Theorem

$(\text{SN}(\square), \text{iGL})$  is recursively strong downward compact. Moreover  
 $\llbracket \text{iGL}, \text{parb} \rrbracket \text{LeA} \vdash A \triangleright \lfloor A \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}}$ .

## A flavour of proof.

In the computation of  $\lfloor A \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}}$  is not just an add on for the Visser's NNIL-algorithm. One must go inside that algorithm and make some additional instruction.

$x \rightarrow B$  is approximated by  $\lfloor B[\hat{x} : \top] \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}}$ .

$B \rightarrow x$  is approximated by  $\lfloor \neg B \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}}$ . □

**Ax :**  $A \triangleright B$ , for every  $iGLC_a \vdash A \rightarrow B$ .

**Le :**  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$ .

**A :**  $A \triangleright \hat{\theta}(A)$ , for every substitution  $\theta$ .

**V(parb) :**  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_{\text{parb}}(E_i)$ , in which  $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$   
 and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ , and

$$\{A\}_{\text{parb}}(B) := \begin{cases} B & : B \in \text{parb} \\ A \rightarrow B & : \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad A \triangleright C}{A \triangleright B \wedge C} \text{Conj}$$

$$\frac{B \triangleright A \quad C \triangleright A}{B \vee C \triangleright A} \text{Disj}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad B \triangleright C}{A \triangleright C} \text{Cut}$$

$$\frac{A \triangleright B \quad (C \in \text{parb})}{C \rightarrow A \triangleright C \rightarrow B}$$



## Examples

[◀ back to e1](#)

- $\lfloor x \rfloor = \perp$
- $\lfloor A \rfloor = \perp$  if  $A \in \mathcal{L}_0(\text{var})$  and  $A$  is not a theorem of IPC.
- $\lfloor p \rightarrow x \rfloor = \neg p$
- $\lfloor \Box x \rightarrow x \rfloor = \neg \Box x$
- $\lfloor \Box x \rightarrow y \rfloor = \neg \Box x$ .



- $H(\Gamma, T) := \{\Box A \rightarrow \Box B : A \stackrel{T}{\approx} B\}$ .
- Hence iGLH( $\Gamma, T$ ) is iGL plus the axiom  $H(\Gamma, T)$ .
- $iGLH := iGLH(C\downarrow SN(\Box), iGL)$ . (provability logic of HA)
- $iGLH^\square := iGLH(SN(\Box), iGL)$ . (complete but not sound)
- $iGLC_a H_\sigma := iGLC_a H(SN, iGLC_a)$ . ( $\Sigma_1$ -provability logic of HA)



## On Provability Logic of HA

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## Question

*Why the PLHA is not simply the following?*

iGL plus  $\square A \rightarrow \square B$  for every  $A \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\sim} B$

- Currently the provability logic of HA is iGL plus  $\square A \rightarrow \square B$  for **some**  $A, B$  satisfying  $A \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\sim} B$ . This means that  $A \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\underset{\text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)}{\sim}} B$  implies  $A \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\sim} B$ .
- Moreover, one expects that *only* those admissible rules of iGL belong to the PLHA which HA can formalize and verify them for herself.
- $\square A \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\sim} A$  however HA is not able to verify it.
- Similarly following is admissible while HA can not verify:  
 $\square(A \vee B) \rightarrow (\square A \vee \square B) \stackrel{\text{iGL}}{\sim} \square(A \rightarrow B) \vee \square(B \rightarrow A)$ .

## $\{\{\mathsf{T}, \Delta\}\}$ (Compare with $[\mathsf{T}, \Delta]$ )

$\mathsf{T}$ : All theorems of  $\mathsf{T}$ .

$\mathsf{V}(\Delta)$ :  $B \rightarrow C \triangleright \bigvee_{i=1}^{n+m} \{B\}_\Delta(E_i)$ , in which  
 $B = \bigwedge_{i=1}^n (E_i \rightarrow F_i)$  and  $C = \bigvee_{i=n+1}^{n+m} E_i$ .

Mont( $\Delta$ ):  $A \triangleright B \rightarrow (C \rightarrow A) \triangleright (C \rightarrow B)$  for every  $C \in \Delta$ .

Le:  $A \triangleright \square A$  for every  $A$ .

Disj:  $(B \triangleright A \wedge C \triangleright A) \rightarrow (B \vee C) \triangleright A$ .

Conj:  $[(A \triangleright B) \wedge (A \triangleright C)] \rightarrow (A \triangleright (B \wedge C))$ .

Cut:  $[(A \triangleright B) \wedge (B \triangleright C)] \rightarrow (A \triangleright C)$ .

MP:  $A, A \rightarrow B / B$ .

PNec:  $A \rightarrow B / A \triangleright B$ .





## iPH includes iGLH

◀ PLHA

### Lemma

$iGLH \vdash A$  implies  $iPH \vdash A$ .

### Proof.

By induction on the proof complexity of  $iGLH \vdash A$ . All cases are trivial except for axiom instances of  $H(C \downarrow SN(\square), iGL)$ , i.e.  $A = \square B \rightarrow \square C$  with  $B \stackrel{iGL}{\underset{C \downarrow SN(\square)}{\approx}} C$ .  implies that  $\llbracket iGL, \text{parb} \rrbracket Le \vdash B \triangleright C$  and hence  $iPH \vdash B \triangleright C$ . 



- Iemhoff [2003] provides soundness and completeness of iPH for some class of intuitionistic modal Kripke models.

$$\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A \triangleright B \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall u \sqsupset w (\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash A \Rightarrow \mathcal{K}, u \Vdash B).$$

- Iemhoff [2001a] also proved some partial completeness results corresponding to some fragments of iGLH.
- Mentioned Kripke models are infinite. This makes them difficult to work with.
- Here we provide Kripke-style semantic for provability and preservativity which enjoys finite-model property.
- The main idea is that we assign a proposition  $\varphi_w$  to each node  $w$  and

$$\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash \square B \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall u \sqsupset w (\varphi_w \vdash B)$$





## Definition

$\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V, \varphi)$  is called a  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantic if

$\tilde{\mathcal{K}} := (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V)$  is a transitive conversely well-founded Kripke model for the intuitionistic modal logic and

- $\varphi$  is a function on  $\sqsubset$ -accessible nodes of  $W$  and  $\varphi_w \in \Gamma$ .
- $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash \varphi_w$ .

$$\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash \square A \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \forall u \sqsubset w \varphi_u, \Delta_u \vdash_{\top} A$$

Given a set of modal propositions  $Y$ , define

$$Y_w := \{E \in Y : \mathcal{K}, w \Vdash E\}.$$

Whenever  $\Gamma = \Delta$  we simply say that  $\mathcal{K}$  is a  $(\Gamma, \top)$ -semantic. In this case it doesn't matter how  $\varphi_w \in \Gamma$  are defined.

## Theorem

If  $A \in \Delta\text{-NF}$  and  $\mathcal{K}$  is  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantic then

$$\tilde{\mathcal{K}}, w \Vdash A \text{ iff } \mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A.$$

## Proof.

Straightforward induction on the complexity of  $A$ . □

## Theorem

*Forcing relationship for finite  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantic is decidable whenever  $(\Delta, \top)$  is recursively downward compact and  $\top$  is sound.*

## Proof.

Let  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \square, V, \varphi)$  be a  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantic. We show decidability of  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A$  by double induction on  $W$  ordered by  $\square$  and complexity of  $A$ .

- $A = \square B$ . It is enough to decide  $\Delta_u \vdash_\top \varphi_u \rightarrow B$  for every  $u \square w$ . Since  $(\Delta, \top)$  is recursively downward compact, one may effectively compute  $\lfloor \varphi_u \rightarrow B \rfloor_\Delta^\top$ . By definition of  $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_\Gamma^\top$  it is enough to decide  $\Delta_u \vdash_\top \lfloor \varphi_u \rightarrow B \rfloor_\Delta^\top$  which is equivalent to  $\mathcal{K}, u \Vdash \lfloor \varphi_u \rightarrow B \rfloor_\Delta^\top$ . Then use induction hypothesis.  $\square$

## Definition of Preservativity Semantic

We extend  $\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash A$  to the language  $\mathcal{L}_\triangleright$  as follows:

$$\mathcal{K}, w \Vdash B \triangleright C \quad \Leftrightarrow$$

$$\forall u \sqsupset w \forall E \in \Delta (\Delta_u, \varphi_u \vdash_\tau E \rightarrow B \text{ implies } \Delta_u, \varphi_u \vdash_\tau E \rightarrow C),$$

## Relation to Preservativity

◀ Soundness

### Theorem

$\overset{\tau}{\approx}_{\Gamma}$  is sound for  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantics, i.e. given such preservativity semantics  $\mathcal{K}$ , we have  $\mathcal{K} \Vdash A \triangleright B$  whenever  $A \overset{\tau}{\approx}_{\Gamma} B$ .

### Proof.

Let  $A \overset{\tau}{\approx}_{\Gamma} B$  and  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V, \varphi)$  be a  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \top)$ -semantics and  $w \sqsubset u \in W$  and  $E \in \Delta$  such that  $\varphi_u, \Delta_u, E \vdash_{\top} A$ . Hence there is a finite set  $\Phi_u \subseteq \Delta_u$  such that  $\Phi_u, E, \varphi_u \vdash A$ . By conjunctive closure condition, we have  $\bigwedge \Phi_u \wedge E \wedge \varphi_u \in \Gamma$  and thus by  $A \overset{\tau}{\approx}_{\Gamma} B$  we get  $\Phi_u, E, \varphi_u \vdash_{\top} B$ . Hence we have  $\varphi_u, \Delta_u, E \vdash_{\top} B$ . ◻




# Soundness

◀ Second reduction

## Theorem

*iGLH( $\Gamma, \mathbb{T}$ ) is sound for  $(\Delta, \Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ -semantics whenever  $\text{IPC} \subseteq \mathbb{T}$  and  $\text{SN}(\square) \subseteq \Delta$ .*

- The proof is by induction on  $A \in \mathcal{L}_\square$  and  $W$  ordered by  $\sqsupset$ .
- One may use  to show soundness of  $\text{H}(\Gamma, \mathbb{T})$ .
- $\text{SN}(\square) \subseteq \Delta$  is needed for soundness of iGL and necessitation.
- The proof is straightforward.

## Completeness

### Theorem

*iGLH( $\Gamma, \mathsf{T}$ ) is complete for good ( $\Gamma, \mathsf{T}$ )-semantics, if ( $\Gamma, \mathsf{T}$ ) is sdc and  $\Gamma \supseteq \text{SN}(\square)$  is closed under conjunctions and  $\mathsf{T} \supseteq \text{IPC}$ .*

### Proof.

Let  $\text{iGLH}(\Gamma, \mathsf{T}) \not\vdash A$ . Then by  $\blacktriangleright$  we also have  $\text{iGLH}(\Gamma, \mathsf{T}) \not\vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_\Gamma^\top$  and a fortiori  $\text{iGL} \not\vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_\Gamma^\top$ .  $\blacktriangleright$  implies that there is some good Kripke model  $\tilde{\mathcal{K}} := (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V)$  such that  $\tilde{\mathcal{K}}, w_0 \not\vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_\Gamma^\top$ . Define  $\mathcal{K} := (W, \preceq, \sqsubset, V, \varphi)$  and choose  $\varphi_w \in \Gamma$  as you want.  $\blacktriangleright$  implies that  $\llbracket A \rrbracket_\Gamma^\top \in \Gamma\text{-NF}$  and  $\blacktriangleright$  implies  $\mathcal{K} \not\vdash \llbracket A \rrbracket_\Gamma^\top$ . Then soundness implies desired result.  $\square$

### Corollary

$iGLC_a H_\sigma$  is sound and complete for  $C_a$  good  
(SN,  $iGLC_a$ )-semantics.

### Corollary

$iGLH^\square$  is sound and complete for good (SN( $\square$ ), iGL)-semantics.

### Corollary

$iGLH$  is sound for (SN( $\square$ ),  $C\downarrow SN(\square)$ , iGL)-semantics.

- Since  $C\downarrow SN(\square)$  is not closed under conjunctions we do not have completeness of iGLH for  $(C\downarrow SN(\square), iGL)$ -semantics.
- Like most useful results, the proof of following theorem is not easy!
- Its proof needs its own saturation and truth lemmas.
- See the manuscript for details.

### Theorem

*iGLH is complete for good  $(SN(\square), C\downarrow SN(\square), iGL)$ -semantics.*

### Corollary

*iGLH is decidable.*

## Back to example $\not\vdash \square(x \vee y) \rightarrow (\square x \vee \square y)$

- That model  $\mathfrak{M}$  is  $(\text{SN}(\square), \text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square), \text{iGL})$ -semantic.
- $\mathcal{K}, w \not\vdash \square y$ :

### Proof.

Enough to show  $\text{SN}(\square)_u, \square x \not\vdash y$ . If  $\text{SN}(\square)_u \vdash \square x \rightarrow y$ , then  $\text{SN}(\square)_u \vdash \lfloor \square x \rightarrow y \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}}$ . As we saw earlier  $\mathfrak{M}$ ,  $\lfloor \square x \rightarrow y \rfloor_{\text{SN}(\square)}^{\text{iGL}} = \neg \square x$ . Thus  $\text{SN}(\square)_u \vdash \neg \square x$ . Hence by soundness of iGL we have  $\mathcal{K}, u \vdash \neg \square x$ , a contradiction.  $\square$

- This shows that  $\text{iGLH} \not\vdash \square(x \vee y) \rightarrow (\square x \vee \square y)$ .

## Theorem

*The provability logic of HA is iGLH and hence is decidable.*

## Proof.

Soundness:  $\text{iGLH} \vdash A$  implies  $\text{HA} \vdash \alpha_{\text{HA}}(A)$  for every  $\alpha$ .

► implies  $\text{iGLH} \subseteq \text{iPH}$ . Then by soundness of iPH ► we have desired result.

Completeness:  $\text{iGLH} \not\vdash A$  implies  $\text{HA} \not\vdash \alpha_{\text{HA}}(A)$  for some  $\alpha$ .

$\text{iGLH} \not\vdash A$  implies  $\text{iGLC}_a\text{H}_\sigma \not\vdash \theta(A)$  for some propositional modal substitution  $\theta$  (we will see later). Then arithmetical completeness of  $\text{iGLC}_a\text{H}_\sigma$  implies desired result.  $\square$



## iGLH $\not\vdash A$ implies iGLC<sub>a</sub>H<sub>σ</sub> $\not\vdash \theta(A)$

The proof is broken in two steps:




- 1 iGLH  $\not\vdash A$  implies iGLH<sup>□</sup>  $\not\vdash \gamma(A)$  for some  $\gamma$ .
- 2 iGLH<sup>□</sup>  $\not\vdash A$  implies iGLC<sub>a</sub>H<sub>σ</sub>  $\not\vdash \beta(A)$  for some  $\beta$ .

Both are proved via provability semantics.



## iGLH $^\square \not\vdash A$ implies iGLC $_a$ H $_\sigma \not\vdash \beta(A)$

### Sketch of the proof.




- Since iGLH $^\square \not\vdash A$ , by completeness for (SN( $\square$ ), iGL)-semantics ,  $\mathcal{K} \not\vdash A$  for some  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \square, V, \top)$ .
- On the other hand, iGLC $_a$ H $_\sigma$  is sound for CP $_a$  (SN( $\square$ ), SN, iGLC $_a$ )-semantics. 
- One must transform  $\mathcal{K}$  to a (SN( $\square$ ), SN, iGLC $_a$ )-semantic.
- The transformation is a uniform collection of transformations for iGL and iGLC $_a$  .
- See the manuscript for details.

# iGLH $\not\vdash A$ implies iGLH $^\square \not\vdash \gamma(A)$

- The first step reduction is not as elementary as the second one.
- It uses features of relative projectivity and simultaneous fixed point theorem.

## iGLH $\not\vdash A$ implies iGLH $^\square \not\vdash \gamma(A)$

### Sketch of the proof.

- iGLH  $\not\vdash A$  implies  $\mathcal{K} \not\vdash A$  for some good  $(\text{SN}(\square), \text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square), \text{iGL})$ -semantic  $\mathcal{K} = (W, \preceq, \square, V, \varphi)$  
- Since  $\varphi_w \in \text{C}\downarrow\text{SN}(\square)$  there is an  $(\text{SN}(\square), \text{iGL})$ -projective substitution  $\theta_w$  such that  $\hat{\theta}_w(\varphi_w) \in \text{SN}(\square)$ .
- The main idea is that one-by-one we must kill  $\varphi_w$ 's and send them in to the set  $\text{SN}(\square)$ .
- Good news: when some  $\varphi_w$  goes in to  $\text{SN}(\square)$  it remains there since  $\text{SN}(\square)$  is closed under substitutions.
- Bad news: These  $\hat{\theta}_w$ 's are not even substitutions.
- Solution: simultaneous fixed point theorem in iGL  


# Thanks For Your Attention

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